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There is an increasing interest in the concept of social exclusion and the
related concept of social isolation and their potential role in understanding
inequality. We examine the degree to which voluntary separation from
social activities during adolescence aﬀects adult wages. It is well-known
that participation in high school athletic programs leads to higher adult
wages. We present empirical evidence that this premium is not primarily
due to selection on predetermined characteristics valued in the labor market.
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There is increasing interest in the concept of social exclusion and its potential
role in understanding inequality.1 Barry (1998) discusses a similar concept, social
isolation, which he deﬁnes as the phenomenon of non-participation in a society’s
institutions. Social exclusion is distinguished from social isolation in that the
former refers to those cases in which an individual’s non-participation is due to
circumstances outside his or her control, while social isolation may result from an
individual’s voluntary choices.
That non-participation in society’s institutions may be voluntary does not
lessen the consequences. Understanding the diﬀerences among individuals that
lead to diﬀerences in economic success is a central concern in economics. While
the bulk of the work investigating the economic consequences of individual diﬀer-
ences focuses on investment in education and on the intergenerational transfer of
inequality, there is a literature that emphasizes the importance of “non-cognitive”
skills such as social adaptability, motivation and self esteem (see, e.g., Heckman
(2000)).2 Our aim in this paper is to investigate the acquisition of non-cognitive
skills that are valued in the labor force through voluntary participation in so-
cial activities. We take the point of view that while there may be some intrinsic
diﬀerences among individuals in social adaptability and motivation, some of the
diﬀerences arise from choices individuals make. In particular, we assume that
individuals make choices about whether to engage in activities that are primarily
social, by which we mean activities for which the primary goal is not the acqui-
sition of marketable skills.3 Participants will, however, accumulate skills that are
valued in the labor market as a by-product of participation in the social activities.
A leading example of such activities are athletic programs for adolescents (or
pre-adolescents). A miniscule fraction of the participants of little league baseball
may go on to play professional baseball, but for the overwhelming majority, the
baseball skills acquired have absolutely no market value. It is widely believed
that participants nevertheless beneﬁt in important ways; many believe that par-
ticipants learn, among other things, discipline, the importance of hard work, and
1See, e.g., Loury (2000) for a good discussion of the potential role of the concept in economics.
2Although the literature describes these skills as non-cognitive, the use of such skills may in
fact involve cognition, i.e., the exercise of perception, thought and reason.
3Putnam et al. (1993) emphasizes the economic importance of participation in social activ-
ities; Putnam (2000) documents that decrease in such participation and the economic conse-
quences of the decline. Our focus, however, is the eﬀect on individuals of social isolation, rather
than on the societal cost.
2interpersonal skills.
Athletic programs are not unique among activities that are commonly thought
to generate substantial beneﬁt st op a r t i c i p a n t s ,a se v i d e n c e db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h e
admission committees of many universities put substantial weight on participa-
tion in drama clubs, school newspapers and yearbooks, and student government
(among many such activities). An important pair of facts about such activities
is that there is substantial variation in the degree to which young people partici-
pate in them, and there are large wage premia associated with participation. For
example, in the U.S., 52% of white males participate in high school athletics, and
conditional on family background and demographic variables, we will show that
there is 20 — 25% adult wage premium associated with participation.
In light of substantial wage premia associated with participation in social ac-
tivities, a natural question is whether exclusion from such activities — voluntary
or otherwise — plays an important role in inequality. Any answer to this question
requires thinking carefully about the decision of what activities (if any) individ-
uals participate in, and how participation might inﬂuence adult wages. There is
an obvious question of the predetermined characteristics of those who choose to
participate in an activity. It may be that there is an unobservable characteristic,
such as intelligence, that is associated both with participation and with higher
adult wages. In this case, participating or not participating has no eﬀect on the
wage despite the correlation.
Even if participation is directly linked to the adult wage premium, inducing an
individual to participate when he or she otherwise would not may not lead to that
person’s receiving the adult wage premium. It may be that the wage premia are
due to increased self-esteem stemming from participation. Forcing an individual
who can not sing to join the choir could conceivably lead to lower wages if this
were the case.
We will argue that selection on predetermined characteristics valued in the
labor market does not explain an important portion of the wage premium. Hence,
unequal participation in these activities that lead to higher wages is a source of
inequality. A full understanding of inequality requires an understanding of the
consequences of uneven participation, whether it stems from voluntary choices or
from external constraints.
Athletics is but one type of social participation that can have subsidiary eco-
nomic consequences, and perhaps not the most important. A problem in con-
sidering other activities is that participation is often not “0-1”; one can gather
with friends at the local Starbucks as frequently or infrequently as one wants. An
3advantage of focusing on athletics as an activity is that participation, at least in
school-organized athletic programs, is relatively well-deﬁned. One has a regular
practice schedule, and one is dropped from the activity if one deviates nontriv-
ially from that schedule. Because of the relatively clear deﬁnition of whether an
individual participates in an athletic program or not, there is greater consistency
across people of what participation entails. We do believe, however, that there is
a vast array of less well-deﬁned activities that people participate in — or do not
participate in — that are at least as important in producing the social skills that
are valued in the market. The economic consequences of social isolation are, we
believe, substantially greater than those identiﬁed in this paper.
We describe the data and the estimation results in the next section and discuss
our results in a concluding section.
2. Empirics
As mentioned in the introduction, while our interest is in the eﬀects of participa-
tion in a broad array of social activities we limit our attention in this paper to
participation in athletic programs. We further restrict attention to participation
of males in high school athletics.4
We provide indirect evidence suggesting that skills valued by the labor mar-
ket are actually acquired from either participation or success in athletics. First
we document the substantial adult wage premium associated with participation
in high school athletics. Second, we investigate three potential sources of that
premium: 1) skills acquired through participation, 2) selection on pre-existing,
productive attributes, and 3) crowding out of negative activities. Determining
whether the athlete wage premium reﬂects skills acquired through participation,
rather than selection on pre-existing attributes or the crowding out of negative
activities, is made diﬃcult by the scarcity of measurable exogenous variation in
the opportunities for, or costs of, participation.5 Here we adopt two strategies to
shed light on this question. The ﬁrst strategy examines the relationship between
participation in athletics and participation in negative activities, and whether
4Restricting attention to males avoids an obvious problem of diﬀerences by gender in the way
that the labor market values skills acquired through participation. This restriction also avoids
the knottier problem of selection into the labor market for women. It would be interesting to
carry out an analysis for females similar to our treatement of males.
5Stevenson (2003) uses the change in opportunties for athletics participation by females that
resulted from the enactment of Title IX of the Educational Ammendments of 1972.
4that relationship can explain the wage premium received by athletes. The second
strategy uses an optimizing framework to generate predictions consistent with
skills being acquired from participation in athletics.
2.1. The Athlete Wage Premium
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), 1979 cohort
we show ﬁrst that there is a substantial wage premium associated with having
been a high school athlete. The NLSY began, in 1979, with 12,686 men and
women ages 14-21, and has interviewed this cohort every year until 1994, and
every other year since then. In 1984, retrospective questions about participation
in high school athletics were asked only of those who had ﬁnished or were expected
to ﬁnish high school.6 We restrict most of our attention to males who were 17
years old or younger when interviewed in 1980.7 Table 1 compares the wages,
measured in 1996 when these men were ages 31-33, of athletes and non-athletes,
along with their demographic and family background characteristics.
This simple comparison shows a dramatic diﬀerence in the adult wages of ath-
letes and non-athletes. Comparing the mean natural log of wages, those who
participated in high school athletics earn approximately 26 percent more than
those did not participate. Importantly, these athletes come from family back-
grounds that are also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In particular, Table 1 shows that
compared with non-athletes, those who participated in sports, on average, come
from larger families with more educated parents who were more likely to have
worked in skilled or professional occupations. Thus, a natural concern is that
the disparities in the average adult outcomes of athletes and non-athletes derive
from these diﬀerences in family background rather than any form of premium for
athletics. Growing up in families with more human and ﬁnancial capital, athletes
may have an advantage on the labor market for reasons that have nothing to do
with the fact that they played sports in high school.
T oa c c o u n tf o rt h ei n ﬂuence of these systematic diﬀerences in family back-
6That the question was asked only of those men who ﬁnished high school or planned to ﬁnish
high school leads to sample selection. However, if as seems likely, those students who dropped
out are less likely to have participated in athletics, and more likely to earn lower wages, this
would bias downwards our estimates of any premium associated with athletic participation.
7This younger sample has the advantage that it was actually attending high school when it
was asked questions about negative activities such as crime, drug use, and TV watching. Indeed,
only these younger men were asked, in 1980, questions about certain negative activities such as
skipping school and underage drinking.
5ground, Table 2 presents OLS estimates of the relationship between participation
in athletics and adult wages, controlling for a number of family characteristics. In
Column 1, the ﬁrst, simple regression of log wages on participation in athletics,
age, region of current residence and urban/rural status of high school indicates
that participation in high school athletics is associated with a 27 percent adult
wage premium.8 Adding controls for race and ethnicity in Column 2 leaves the
estimated athlete wage premium essentially unchanged. Controlling for family
characteristics including parents’ education and occupation status, and number
of siblings in Column 3, the coeﬃcient on participation in athletics is reduced
to 21 percent. Thus, these diﬀerences in family background account for only a
modest portion of the disparity in wages between athletes and non-athletes.
Schools that oﬀer more athletic programs, and therefore have more athletes,
may also have better teachers, peers, and other resources and thus provide their
students an advantage on the labor market. It is therefore possible that the ath-
lete wage premium is, to some extent, a school quality premium. To investigate
this possibility, we consider whether diﬀerences in measures of school quality such
as school size, student-teacher ratio, disadvantaged student ratio, dropout rate
and teacher turnover rate may explain the wage premium paid to athletes. Be-
cause many schools did not respond to the NLSY survey, a substantial portion of
our younger male subsample (32%) is lost when we condition on these variables.
Restricting attention to the remaining sample with suﬃcient data, Columns 4 and
5 of Table 2 present the eﬀects of adding controls for measures school quality. We
ﬁnd that while these measures of school quality are associated with adult wages
in the expected way, they are not responsible for the athlete premium. Introduc-
ing controls for school quality leaves the estimated eﬀect of adult height on adult
wages essentially unchanged.9
8Baron, et al. (2000), using the NLSY estimate a conditional athletics premium ranging from
statistical zero (in a two-stage least-squares estimation) to 29%, depending on the conditioning
factors.
9One might worry that the higher wage for athletesi sd r i v e nb yaf e wp r o f e s s i o n a la t h l e t e s .
This is not, however, the case. The maximum wage in our sample is $90 per hour in 1996 dollars,
and 98% earn a wage less than $47 per hour. Trimming the top 2% of the wage distribution
slightly increases our estimates of the athletic participation premium. Trimming both the highest
and lowest 2% slightly reduces our estimates of the premium.
62.2. Athletics and Participation in Negative Activities
The previous subsection suggests that diﬀerences in the family backgrounds and
schools of high school athletes explain only a modest amount of the advantage
that these athletes enjoy in the labor market. Our thesis is that participation in
athletic programs leads to the accumulation of skills valued in the labor market.
A leading alternative explanation for the athlete premium is that athletes are
more likely to possess, exogenously, unobservable attributes that have value in
the labor market. For example, those endowed with a greater orientation toward
the future (patience or discipline) may be more willing to practice their sport and
thus trade time spent sleeping and watching TV for a position on a high school
athletic team. Those with more patience may also be more likely to supply eﬀort
to a project at work in exchange for a later raise in pay. To the extent that
such a correlation explains the athlete premium, the importance of participation
in athletics for wage inequality would be limited. Athletes would do well in the
labor market no matter what.
Alternatively, a common argument in support of high school athletics programs
is that sports occupy time that would otherwise be spent pursuing negative activ-
ities. Simply by providing teenagers with relatively enjoyable opportunities to be
under the supervision of adults, athletics may occupy time that would otherwise
be spent in activities, such as doing drugs, having unprotected sex, or committing
crime, that have long-term, negative consequences. Thus, rather than selecting
teenagers with skills, or conferring skills on those who participate, athletics may
instead crowd out negative behaviors.
To investigate whether the athlete wage premium reﬂects either selection on
certain unobservable characteristics like future orientation, or the crowding out of
negative activities, we explore the relationship between participation in high school
athletics, participation in teenage activities such as truancy, unprotected sex, drug
use, smoking, crime, and adult wages. Table 3 compares the tendencies of athletes
and non-athletes to participate in various, seemingly negative teenage activities.10
This simple comparison of means shows that high school athletes are signiﬁcantly
less likely to skip school, have unprotected sex, use marijuana or other drugs, be
charged with a crime, watch television or smoke cigarettes. Among the seemingly
negative activities we consider, athletes are only more likely to drink underage.
To the extent that participation in these activities is correlated with negative
unobservables such as impatience or impulsiveness, these comparisons suggest
10Appendix A1 provides the precise deﬁnitions of these behaviors.
7that athletes may be paid more not because they had participated in athletics,
but rather because they are exogenously endowed with attributes valued by the
labor market. Alternatively, to the extent that participation in these activities
has long term negative consequences on wages, these comparisons suggest that
athletes may be paid more because the time they spent playing sports kept them
taking up these negative activities (the "crowding out" hypothesis).
Our data do not provide direct evidence of the correlation between unobserv-
able characteristics such as impatience and participation in activities like truancy,
unprotected sex, smoking and crime;11 and we cannot provide direct evidence
that these activities lower later productivity. We can, however, demonstrate that
participation in these negative activities is associated with lower wages. Table 4,
Columns 1-9 shows that participation in each of these activities is, when consid-
ered by itself, and net of diﬀerences in family background, negatively correlated
with adult wages. When we condition on all of these choices simultaneously (Ta-
ble 4, Column 10), we ﬁnd that most are negatively associated with adult wages,
and some signiﬁcantly so. For example, using illegal drugs as a teenager is, con-
ditional on family background and participation in the other seemingly negative
activities, associated with a 12 percent adult wage penalty. Being charged with a
crime while a teenager is associated with a 22 percent wage penalty. So while it is
unclear whether participation in these activities actually diminishes productivity,
or is merely correlated with traits that are penalized in the labor market, it is
clear that most of these activities are associated with lower wages.
The central question then is to what extent the tendency for athletes to avoid
such negative activities account, either through selection on productive traits or
through the crowding out of negative behavior, for the athlete wage premium? If
the wage premium is due to the crowding out of negative behaviors that adversely
aﬀect adult wages, we should see a substantial drop in the athlete wage premium
when we control for the negative behaviors. That is, there should be little or
no premium for those athletes who did engage in the negative behaviors. This
is not the case, however. Table 5 shows the results from OLS estimates of the
relationship between participation in athletics and adult wages, conditional on
both family background and region, and on participation in negative activities.
Column 1 of Table 5 presents the analogue of the estimate in Column 3 of Table 2
11Fuchs (1982) shows that the rate of time preference, measured by answers to questions
about hypothetical choices between a sum of money now and a larger sum at a speciﬁcp o i n ti n
the future, is positively correlated with smoking. Munasinghe and Sicherman (2001) and Della
Vigna and Paserman (2003) also use some of these measures as proxies for impatience.
8for the subsample for which we have data on participation in negative activities.
Net of diﬀerences in family background and region, we ﬁnd a 21 percent athlete
wage premium in this subsample. Conditioning on participation in negative activ-
ities in Column 2, we ﬁnd that the estimated relationship between participation
in high school athletics and adult wages is only modestly diminished. Controlling
for participation in negative activities, we estimate an 18 percent athlete wage
premium. We view these results as suggesting that the athlete wage premium
is largely not attributable to the crowding out of activities that have negative
long-term eﬀects on later wages.
Analogously, if the wage premium were due to selection on productive unob-
servables such as forward orientation that are correlated with making choices to
delay gratiﬁcation obtained from activities like sex, drugs and crime, controlling
for negative behaviors should reduce the athlete wage premium. We thus interpret
these results as consistent with a large part of the athlete wage premium not due
to selection. The possibility remains, however, that participation in athletics is
simply a much better correlate of these unobservables than is the avoidance of
unprotected sex, cigarettes, and participation in crime.
A related concern is that the athletic wage premium reﬂects selection on
productive traits such as cognitive ability. To address this concern, we exam-
ine whether the estimated athlete premium is substantially diminished when we
control for cognitive ability as measured by an Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT).12 In Column 3 we present results analogous to the estimates from Col-
umn 2, but restricting attention to that subsample for whom we have an AFQT
score. In Column 4, we add a control for the AFQT score, and ﬁnd the athlete
premium is diminished by an additional third to a still economically and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant 12 percent premium.13 Thus, conditioning on both participation
in negative activities and on a measure of cognitive ability reduces the estimated
athlete premium by approximately 45 percent. We interpret these results as con-
sistent with a substantial portion of the athlete premium not being due to selec-
12The AFQT is a vocational aptitude test. It reﬂects the scores from word knowledge, para-
graph comprehension, math knowledge and arithmetic reasoning tests. The tests were admin-
istered as part of the NLSY in the summer and fall of 1980 when the respondents were ages
15-23. Thus, for some, the test reﬂects their achievement at or before the time they participated
in high school athletics, while for others the test also reﬂects later achievement.
13If, in addition, we control for highest grade of schooling completed at various ages, the
estimated athlete premium is essentially unchanged. If we control only for AFQT, family back-
ground and region, the estimated athlete premium is 13.8 percent.
9tion on productive traits.14 I ns u m m a r y ,w ev i e wt h ee v i d e n c ea sc o n s i s t e n tw i t h
the athlete wage premium not primarily resulting from selection on unobservable
characteristics or from the crowding out of negative behaviors. Rather, the re-
sults suggest that participation in athletics may have an economically substantial,
direct inﬂuence on later wages.
2.3. Inference From Optimizing Choices
We argued in the previous section that the evidence suggests that a substantial
portion of the athlete wage premium is due to a direct eﬀect of participation
in athletics. Why, then, don’t all students participate if there is an adult wage
premium for doing so? What accounts for two individuals indistinguishable (to the
econometrician) making diﬀerent decisions about participation? For participation
in athletic programs, there is a constraint on the number of participants. The
number of people who are on an athletic team is limited both by resources available
and by interschool regulations. Typically, a number of students will try out for
a sport, with those who are less good at the sport dropping out, voluntarily or
involuntarily. When students can forecast, even imperfectly, those students with
greater athletic ability will naturally be more likely to participate.
There are now two possibilities. First, athletic ability is not by itself associated
with higher adult wages, in which case the athlete wage premium arises from
participation. Alternatively, athletic ability is correlated with attributes that are
valued in the labor force, in which case participation may not directly aﬀect adult
wages. For example, it might be that students may signal that they have strong
motivation and discipline by participating in athletics. We will argue that the
former is the case.
Suppose that those with greater athletic ability are also those with greater pre-
existing skills valued by the labor market. Then, in a school where participation
in athletics is more competitive, the selected group of athletes will be of higher
ability than those selected in a school where participation is less competitive.
Thus to the extent that the athletics participation premium is due to selection on
pre-existing skills, the wages of athletes in competitive schools should, on average,
be higher than those of athletes in less competitive schools.
14It is also possible that participation in athletics directly or indirectly increases cognitive
ability. For example, participation might produce greater eﬀort in school, and consequently
increase cognitive ability. The results in Columns 3 and 4 suggest that a substantial portion of
the athlete wage premium is not generated in this way.
10In the U.S., the rate of participation in athletics is, as expected, decreasing in
the population of the school. For example, using data from the NLSY, we ﬁnd
that male students attending schools of above median size are 9 percentage points
(18 percent) less likely to participate in athletics than those attending smaller
schools.15 (See Table 6, Column 1.) This result is consistent with competition for
positions on teams being higher at larger schools.16 If competition for places on
teams is higher at larger schools, and if there is monotone selection on pre-existing
ability valued by the labor market, we would expect athletes at larger schools to
1) have higher ability and 2) be associated with greater wage premia than those
at smaller schools.
We look for evidence of these eﬀects of increased competition at larger schools
in two ways. First, we examine whether athletes at larger schools have higher rel-
ative levels of skills valued by the labor market than athletes at smaller schools.
Speciﬁcally, we examine the relationship between the AFQT scores of those par-
ticipating in athletics by size of school. AFQT scores are particularly interesting
because the skills they measure are valued in the labor market.17 We ﬁnd no
evidence that the athletes in more competitive schools have more of the skills
reﬂected in AFQT scores than athletes at less competitive schools. If anything,
the results in Table 6, Column 2 suggest that athletes at larger schools may have
lower AFQT scores than those at smaller schools. The point estimates indicate
that participation in athletics is associated with an AFQT score that is 11 per-
centile points higher at smaller schools, but only 9 points higher at larger schools.
These results are consistent with larger schools having athletics programs that
a r em o r ec o m p e t i t i v e ,a n dy e tn om o r es e l e c t i v eo np r e - e x i s t i n gs k i l l sv a l u e db y
the labor market. An alternative interpretation is that in schools where athletics
is more competitive, more time must be spent practicing in order to participate,
leaving less time for scholastic work that improves AFQT scores. Consistent with
15This result conditions on the region and urban-rural status of the school, as well as on the
age and family background of the student.
16Futher evidence in support of greater competition at larger schools is found in the variation
in high school sports programs by state. Using data from the National Federation of State High
School Associations, we ﬁnd that in states with, on average, larger high schools, the fraction
of high schools oﬀering various boys sports programs is only somewhat larger. For example,
conditional on region, an increase in the size of a state’s average high school by 100 students is
associated with an increase in the probability that the school oﬀers a boys football program by
just 6 percent. Similar results hold for each of the 10 most popular sports, except for wrestling
where in states with larger schools the schools are considerably more likely to oﬀer the sport.
17See Neal and Johnson (1996), for example.
11these results, we estimate that athletes in larger schools receive only a modestly
larger wage premium for participation than those in smaller schools (see Table 6,
Column 3). Participation in athletics is associated with a 17.1% adult wage pre-
mium in smaller schools and a 22.5% premium in larger schools. This diﬀerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant.18
Another possibility is that the athlete wage premium is not a premium to skills
acquired through participation but rather, an unmeasured academic premium that
is caused by parent- or school-imposed academic requirements for participating
in athletics.19 We address this possibility in two ways. First we simply note that
the unmeasured academic performance must be net of achievement on the AFQT
test taken in 1980 near the end of the high school career. Second, while data on
academic performance in addition to AFQT are limited, we do have class per-
centile for a small subsample of our data. Table 7 shows the results of including
this direct measure of academic performance to estimates of the athletic wage
premium. For this subset of the data, AFQT and class percentile appear to proxy
for very similar skills; each is positively associated with wages but, conditional
on the other, neither independently explains much additional variation in wages.
More directly, for this subsample we ﬁnd (a) conditional on academic performance
(class percentile) there is a substantial athlete premium, (b) its estimate is little
inﬂuenced by adding controls for negative behaviors. In other words, our quali-
tative conclusions are robust to the inclusion of additional measures of academic
performance. We interpret this result as consistent with the athlete premium not
merely representing a mismeasured academic premium.
We view these results as further evidence that valuable skills are acquired
through participation in, or success at, athletics. Our claim is not that the athlet-
ics participation premium reﬂects no selection on pre-existing skills. There could
be, for example, other skills that are valued in the adult labor market that were
orthogonal to those measured by AFQT, but correlated with athletic participa-
tion. Our results, however, show that selection is unlikely to provide a complete
explanation for the athletics wage premium.
18Each of these results is robust to analysis that restricts attention to the younger sample that
was in high school when it took the AFQT. The results are also robust to adding the controls
for school quality used in Table 2 (student teacher ratio, disadvantaged student ratio, dropout
rate and teacher turnover rate). Adding these controls rules out the possibility that school size
is proxying for school quality.
19We thank the editor for pointing out this possibility.
123. Discussion
1. Related literature. Our examination of whether selection eﬀects are driving the
athlete wage premium is related to that in Barron, et al. (2000) in two ways.
First, Barron, et al. also make use of variation in school enrollment to draw infer-
ence about the athlete premium. In that paper, school size along with measures
of the student’s health, height, weight, family income, geographic location, and
school quality, are used as instruments for athletic participation. We, like Barron
et al., are skeptical of the instrumental variables assumption that school size is
associated with wages only through its eﬀect on participation in athletics. There-
fore, instead of instrumenting for athletics with school size, we draw inference
about the implications for selection on other observables (AFQT) of large schools
having more competitive athletics teams. Second, Barron, et al., also consider
whether diﬀerences in time preferences may explain the athlete premium. They
look for evidence of selection on this characteristic in the wages, and in the ed-
ucation and labor supply decisions of athletes versus non-athletes. We take a
diﬀerent approach and argue that unobservables such as a taste for leisure or im-
patience should be reﬂected not only in the decision to participate in athletics but
also in the decision to participate in activities characterized by immediate gains
and long term expected costs. We then investigate whether participation in these
“negative” activities can explain the athlete premium.
Stevenson (2003) provides supporting evidence that athletic participation gen-
erates beneﬁts. Stevenson uses a “natural experiment” to distinguish between the
hypothesis that seeming beneﬁts from participation stem from selection and the
hypothesis that athletics generates direct beneﬁts. In 1972 the U.S. Congress
enacted Title IX of the Educational Amendments, which essentially banned gen-
der discrimination in federally funded schools. For all practical purposes, Title
IX required schools to equalize (at least approximately) the athletic participation
rates of males and females. Female participation rates increased more than sixfold
over the next six years. States were allowed some time to come into compliance,
and there was substantial variation in the compliance rates. Stevenson uses this
mandated increase to estimate that athletic participation generates an increase in
educational attainment of approximate one quarter of a year and more than a ten
percent increase in the probability of being employed.
Our work diﬀers from Stevenson’s in several ways. First, we focus on males
while her work focuses on females, since they were more aﬀected by Title IX.
Also, prior to Title IX many schools did not oﬀer athletic programs for women,
13and consequently, this was not an avenue through which women diﬀerentially
accumulated the noncognitive s k i l l st h a tm i g h ta c c o u n tf o rd i ﬀerential treatment
later in life. Lastly, Stevenson analyzes the eﬀect of athletic participation on
educational attainment, while the aim of this paper is to investigate the eﬀects of
participation on income.
2. The social activity. Our broad interest is in the beneﬁts of social integration
and the costs of nonintegration. Individuals sometimes do not participate in social
activities, despite the beneﬁts that ﬂow from participation. We focused on partici-
pation in athletic programs, but students can also participate in a large number of
other activities, including student government, yearbook, school newspaper, and
dramatics. Participation in such high school clubs is associated with economically
signiﬁcant adult wage premia, although smaller than the athlete premium: the
eﬀect on adult wages of participating in a high school club is approximately one
third of the eﬀect of participating in athletics (Persico, Postlewaite and Silver-
man (2004)). We mentioned above that we focus on high school athletics because
participation in athletics is typically more structured than participation in many
of these other high school activities. Participating in a drama club may involve
many hours of interaction with other participants during rehearsals and perfor-
mances, but it may also involve nothing more than collecting tickets for a few
hours. Participation in athletics, on the other hand, normally requires at mini-
mum, many hours of regular practice. Given the looser deﬁnition of participation
in these other high school activities, it should not be surprising that the eﬀect of
such participation on adult wages is less than participation in athletics.
The diﬃculty of distinguishing selection into these activities based on at-
tributes valued by the labor market from accumulation of skills stemming from
participation is more diﬃcult for high school clubs than for athletics, because the
strategy that we employed for distinguishing these for athletic programs would be
less compelling here. There is a small number of sports available in high school
and a limited number of students who can participate in each of them, but there
is no limit to the number of clubs that can be formed, nor to the number of partic-
ipants in them. Consequently, one should not necessarily expect that if students
were selecting into clubs on the basis of attributes valued in the labor market, we
would see a stronger relationship between participation and adult wages at large
schools than at small schools.20
20In fact we ﬁnd that students in large schools participate in slightly fewer clubs on average,
though this relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant (results not shown). As with athletics,
though the point estimate is consistent with clubs at big schools being more competitive, we see
14If we assume that as with athletics, participation in these activities leads to the
accumulation of skills valued in the labor market, it is surprising that many stu-
dents do not participate despite the return from doing so. Physical considerations
such as size, height or coordination may constrain some students from participat-
ing in athletics even if they were willing to do so. Most of the nonathletic activities
do not have an exogenous constraint on total participation, and physical consid-
erations are presumably less important than for athletics, and nonparticipation in
c l u b si sp r o b a b l yv o l u n t a r y .
The logic of the individual optimization that determined who participated
in athletic programs described above can readily be extended to the choice of
participation in other clubs. Suppose there is a “social ranking” of students in
a particular school that is independent of characteristics that aﬀe c ta d u l tw a g e s ;
some adolescents are “cool” while others are nerds, geeks or losers. Those who are
cool are easily accepted by others and treated well, while those who are not are
t r e a t e dw i t hd i s d a i n ;t h i sd i ﬀerential social treatment leads to diﬀerent returns
to individuals of diﬀerent social rank.21 All individuals may incur the same eﬀort
and time cost to participate and enjoy the same expected adult wage premium
associated with participation, but the diﬀerences in the social treatment can lead
to diﬀerent participation decisions.
In summary, diﬀerential social treatment can, not surprisingly, lead to diﬀerent
choices about participation. Even when the abilities that aﬀect how well a student
does at an activity (speed or singing ability, for example) are not directly valued in
the labor market, diﬀerential participation will aﬀect relative adult wages, because
participation per se aﬀects wages.
no stronger relationship between participation in clubs and adult wages at large schools than at
small schools.
21This is reminiscent of Esteban and Ray (1994).
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16Table 1: Adult Wages, Demographic and Family Background Characteristics, by Participation in Athletics, for Younger Males in the NLSY 
  Ln(wage) in 





























(0.113)  486 

















(0.099)**  479 
 
Notes: Sample consists only of males who were less than 18 years old at their interview in 1980, and working full-time in 1996. Parents are identified as 
professional if they work in a professional/managerial occupation. 
 
  
Table 2: Relationship Between Adult Wages and Participation in Athletics, for Younger Males in 
the NLSY 
  Dependent Variable: Ln(Wage) in 1996 
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(100s)       0.011 
(0.004) 
Student/teacher ratio       -0.005 
(0.009) 
Disadvantaged student 
ratio       -0.001 
(0.0012) 
Dropout rate       -0.002 
(0.001) 
Teacher turnover rate       -0.002 
(0.004) 
N  965 965 965 656 656 
Adjusted R
2  0.062 0.103 0.130 0.109 0.126 
F-Statistic  (K,N-K-1)  12.23 14.02 12.80  7.41  6.76 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
Notes: Sample consists only of males who were less than 18 years old at their interview in 1980, and working full-
time in 1996. Each specification includes controls for region, urban/rural status of high school and a constant term, 
results omitted. 
 
Table 3: Participation in Negative Teenage Activities, by Participation in Athletics, for Younger Males in the NLSY 




Sex in last 
month 
Unprotected 
































(0.022)  455 

















(0.021)**  456 
Notes: Sample consists only of males who were less than 18 years old at their interview in 1980, working full-time in 1996, and for whom data exists on each of 
the negative activities. See Table A1 for variable descriptions.  
Table 4: Relationship Between Adult Wages and Participation Negative Teenage Activities, for Younger Males in the NLSY 
  Dependent Variable: Ln(Wage) in 1996 
Covariates  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Skipped school  -0.106 
(0.042)             -0.043 
(0.045) 
Drank underage    -0.023 
(0.048) 
         0.054 
(0.051) 
Sex in last 
month    
-0.039 
(0.044) 
         0.037 
(0.047) 
Unprotected sex 
in last month    
 -0.085 
(0.062)         -0.053 
(0.066) 
Smoked 
marijuana    
   -0.087 
(0.044)       0.017 
(0.050) 
Used other 
drugs          -0.200 
(0.062)      -0.116 
(0.067) 
Charged with a 
crime           -0.288 
(0.079)     -0.217 
(0.084) 
Hours of TV            -0.0014 
(0.0015)    -0.0018 
(0.0014) 
Smoked a 




N  911 911  911  911  911 911 911 911 911  911 
Adjusted R
2  0.103 0.097  0.097  0.099  0.101 0.107 0.114 0.097 0.121  0.131 
F-Statistic 
(K,N-K-1)  9.45 9.23 9.36  9.30  9.38  9.78 10.54 9.44 10.24  7.67 
 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
Notes: Sample consists only of males who were less than 18 years old at their interview in 1980, and working full-time in 1996. Each specification includes 
controls for age, race, ethnicity, family background, region, urban/rural status of high school and a constant term, results omitted. See Table A1 for variable 
descriptions.  
Table 5: Relationship Between Adult Wages and Participation in Athletics and Participation in 
Negative Teenage Activities, for Younger Males in the NLSY 
  Dependent Variable: Ln(Wage) in 1996 
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Charged with a 


















AFQT Percentile       0.0067 
(0.0009) 
N  911 911 901 901 
Adjusted R
2  0.121 0.146 0.145 0.195 
F-Statistic (K,N-
K-1)  10.63 8.24  8.04  9.81 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
Notes: Sample consists only of males who were less than 18 years old at their interview in 1980, and working full-
time in 1996. Each specification includes controls for age, race, ethnicity, family background, region, urban/rural 
status of high school and a constant term, results omitted. See Table A1 for variable descriptions. 
 
Table 6: The Relationship Between School Size, Participation in Athletics, 
and Adult Wages for Males in the NLSY 







Covariates  (1) (2) (3) 
Participation in  HS 





















N 1861  1861  1861 
R
2 0.049  0.400  0.145 
 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
Notes: Sample consists only of males, who were working full-time in 1996. Each specification 
includes controls for age, race, region, mother’s and father’s education and occupation, number of 
siblings, and a constant term, results omitted. Specification (1) presents the average marginal effects 
from a probit estimation. Specifications (2) and (3) are OLS 
Table 7: Relationship Between Adult Wages and Participation in Athletics and 
Participation in Negative Teenage Activities, for Younger Males in the NLSY, 
Conditioning on High School Class Percentile 
  Dependent Variable: Ln(Wage) in 1996 
Covariates  (1) (2) (3) 
















Skipped school      0.044 
(0.068) 
Drank underage      -0.035 
(0.065) 
Sex in last month      0.080 
(0.066) 
Unprotected sex in 
last month      -0.048 
(0.089) 
Smoked marijuana      -0.024 
(0.073) 
Used other drugs      0.043 
(0.113) 
Charged with a 
crime      -0.284 
(0.185) 
Hours of TV      -0.0047 
(0.0026) 
Smoked a cigarette      -0.118 
(0.067) 
N  396 396 396 
Adjusted R
2  0.154 0.171 0.181 
F-Stat. (K,N-K-1)  5.52 5.40 5.00 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. 
Notes: Sample consists only of males who were less than 18 years old at their interview in 1980, and working full-
time in 1996. Each specification includes controls for age, race, ethnicity, family background, region, urban/rural 
status of high school and a constant term, results omitted. See Table A1 for variable descriptions. 
  
Table A1: Negative Activity Variable Descriptions 
Variable name  Description  Survey Year 
Skipped School  Skipped a full day of school without a real excuse in the 
past year  1980 
Drank underage  Drank beer, wine or liquor without parents’ permission in 
the past year  1980 
Sex in last month  Had sex in the month prior to interview  1983 
Unprotected sex in last 
month 
Had sex in the month prior to interview, and did not 
always do something to prevent pregnancy.  1983 
Smoked marijuana  Smoked marijuana or hashish in the past year  1980 
Used other drugs  Used any drugs or chemicals to get high or for kicks, 
except for marijuana  1980 
Charged with a crime  Ever been booked or charge for breaking a law, either by 
police or by someone connected with the courts  1980 
Hours of TV  Hours spent watching TV in the 7 days prior to the 
interview  1981 
Smoked a cigarette  Smoked at least one cigarette within the 30 days prior to 
the interview  1984 
 